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proxmark3/client/cmdhflist.c
merlokk 2d7bdee30b added parity check of deciphered command
2018-02-12 18:53:12 +02:00

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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Copyright (C) Merlok - 2017
//
// This code is licensed to you under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or,
// at your option, any later version. See the LICENSE.txt file for the text of
// the license.
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Command: hf mf list. It shows data from arm buffer.
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#include "cmdhflist.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "data.h"
#include "ui.h"
#include "iso14443crc.h"
#include "parity.h"
#include "protocols.h"
#include "crapto1/crapto1.h"
#include "mifarehost.h"
#include "mifaredefault.h"
enum MifareAuthSeq {
masNone,
masNt,
masNrAr,
masAt,
masAuthComplete,
masFirstData,
masData,
masError,
};
static enum MifareAuthSeq MifareAuthState;
static TAuthData AuthData;
void ClearAuthData() {
AuthData.uid = 0;
AuthData.nt = 0;
AuthData.first_auth = true;
AuthData.ks2 = 0;
AuthData.ks3 = 0;
}
/**
* @brief iso14443A_CRC_check Checks CRC in command or response
* @param isResponse
* @param data
* @param len
* @return 0 : CRC-command, CRC not ok
* 1 : CRC-command, CRC ok
* 2 : Not crc-command
*/
uint8_t iso14443A_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
{
uint8_t b1,b2;
if(len <= 2) return 2;
if(isResponse & (len < 6)) return 2;
ComputeCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, data, len-2, &b1, &b2);
if (b1 != data[len-2] || b2 != data[len-1]) {
return 0;
} else {
return 1;
}
}
uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
{
switch(MifareAuthState) {
case masNone:
case masError:
return iso14443A_CRC_check(isResponse, data, len);
default:
return 2;
}
}
void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
{
switch(cmd[0])
{
case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:
snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA");
break;
case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT:{
// 93 20 = Anticollision (usage: 9320 - answer: 4bytes UID+1byte UID-bytes-xor)
// 93 70 = Select (usage: 9370+5bytes 9320 answer - answer: 1byte SAK)
if(cmd[1] == 0x70)
{
snprintf(exp,size,"SELECT_UID"); break;
}else
{
snprintf(exp,size,"ANTICOLL"); break;
}
}
case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2:{
//95 20 = Anticollision of cascade level2
//95 70 = Select of cascade level2
if(cmd[2] == 0x70)
{
snprintf(exp,size,"SELECT_UID-2"); break;
}else
{
snprintf(exp,size,"ANTICOLL-2"); break;
}
}
case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:
snprintf(exp,size,"REQA");
break;
case ISO14443A_CMD_READBLOCK: snprintf(exp,size,"READBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case ISO14443A_CMD_WRITEBLOCK: snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case ISO14443A_CMD_HALT:
snprintf(exp,size,"HALT");
MifareAuthState = masNone;
break;
case ISO14443A_CMD_RATS: snprintf(exp,size,"RATS"); break;
case MIFARE_CMD_INC: snprintf(exp,size,"INC(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case MIFARE_CMD_DEC: snprintf(exp,size,"DEC(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case MIFARE_CMD_RESTORE: snprintf(exp,size,"RESTORE(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case MIFARE_CMD_TRANSFER: snprintf(exp,size,"TRANSFER(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case MIFARE_AUTH_KEYA:
if ( cmdsize > 3) {
snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH-A(%d)",cmd[1]);
MifareAuthState = masNt;
} else {
// case MIFARE_ULEV1_VERSION : both 0x60.
snprintf(exp,size,"EV1 VERSION");
}
break;
case MIFARE_AUTH_KEYB:
MifareAuthState = masNt;
snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH-B(%d)",cmd[1]);
break;
case MIFARE_MAGICWUPC1: snprintf(exp,size,"MAGIC WUPC1"); break;
case MIFARE_MAGICWUPC2: snprintf(exp,size,"MAGIC WUPC2"); break;
case MIFARE_MAGICWIPEC: snprintf(exp,size,"MAGIC WIPEC"); break;
case MIFARE_ULC_AUTH_1: snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH "); break;
case MIFARE_ULC_AUTH_2: snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH_ANSW"); break;
case MIFARE_ULEV1_AUTH:
if ( cmdsize == 7 )
snprintf(exp,size,"PWD-AUTH KEY: 0x%02x%02x%02x%02x", cmd[1], cmd[2], cmd[3], cmd[4] );
else
snprintf(exp,size,"PWD-AUTH");
break;
case MIFARE_ULEV1_FASTREAD:{
if ( cmdsize >=3 && cmd[2] <= 0xE6)
snprintf(exp,size,"READ RANGE (%d-%d)",cmd[1],cmd[2]);
else
snprintf(exp,size,"?");
break;
}
case MIFARE_ULC_WRITE:{
if ( cmd[1] < 0x21 )
snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]);
else
snprintf(exp,size,"?");
break;
}
case MIFARE_ULEV1_READ_CNT:{
if ( cmd[1] < 5 )
snprintf(exp,size,"READ CNT(%d)",cmd[1]);
else
snprintf(exp,size,"?");
break;
}
case MIFARE_ULEV1_INCR_CNT:{
if ( cmd[1] < 5 )
snprintf(exp,size,"INCR(%d)",cmd[1]);
else
snprintf(exp,size,"?");
break;
}
case MIFARE_ULEV1_READSIG: snprintf(exp,size,"READ_SIG"); break;
case MIFARE_ULEV1_CHECKTEAR: snprintf(exp,size,"CHK_TEARING(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
case MIFARE_ULEV1_VCSL: snprintf(exp,size,"VCSL"); break;
default: snprintf(exp,size,"?"); break;
}
return;
}
void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t* parity, uint8_t paritysize, bool isResponse) {
if (!isResponse && cmdsize == 1) {
switch(cmd[0]) {
case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:
case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:
MifareAuthState = masNone;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
// get UID
if (MifareAuthState == masNone) {
if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
ClearAuthData();
AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4);
}
if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2 && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
ClearAuthData();
AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4);
}
}
switch(MifareAuthState) {
case masNt:
if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nt %s", (AuthData.first_auth) ? "" : "(enc)");
MifareAuthState = masNrAr;
if (AuthData.first_auth)
AuthData.nt = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
else
AuthData.nt_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
AuthData.nt_enc_par = parity[0];
return;
} else {
MifareAuthState = masError;
}
break;
case masNrAr:
if (cmdsize == 8 && !isResponse) {
snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nr ar (enc)");
MifareAuthState = masAt;
AuthData.nr_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
AuthData.ar_enc = bytes_to_num(&cmd[4], 4);
AuthData.ar_enc_par = parity[0] << 4;
return;
} else {
MifareAuthState = masError;
}
break;
case masAt:
if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at (enc)");
MifareAuthState = masAuthComplete;
AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
AuthData.at_enc_par = parity[0];
return;
} else {
MifareAuthState = masError;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!isResponse && ((MifareAuthState == masNone) || (MifareAuthState == masError)))
annotateIso14443a(exp, size, cmd, cmdsize);
}
bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) {
static struct Crypto1State *traceCrypto1;
static uint64_t mfLastKey;
*mfDataLen = 0;
if (MifareAuthState == masAuthComplete) {
if (traceCrypto1) {
crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
}
MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
return false;
}
if (cmdsize > 32)
return false;
if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) {
if (AuthData.first_auth) {
AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64);
AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.nr_enc, 1);
lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.uid ^ AuthData.nt, 0);
uint64_t lfsr = 0;
crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
crypto1_destroy(revstate);
mfLastKey = lfsr;
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | probable key:%x%x Prng:%s ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
(unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32),
(unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF),
validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD",
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
AuthData.first_auth = false;
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
} else {
// check last used key
if (mfLastKey) {
if (NestedCheckKey(mfLastKey, &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize, parity)) {
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | last used key:%x%x ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
(unsigned int)((mfLastKey & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32),
(unsigned int)(mfLastKey & 0xFFFFFFFF),
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
};
}
// check default keys
if (!traceCrypto1) {
for (int defaultKeyCounter = 0; defaultKeyCounter < MifareDefaultKeysSize; defaultKeyCounter++){
if (NestedCheckKey(MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter], &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize, parity)) {
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | default key:%x%x ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
(unsigned int)((MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter] & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32),
(unsigned int)(MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter] & 0xFFFFFFFF),
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
break;
};
}
}
// nested
if (!traceCrypto1 && validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt)) {
printf("nested. uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
uint32_t ntx = prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 90);
for (int i = 0; i < 16383; i++) {
ntx = prng_successor(ntx, 1);
if (NTParityChk(&AuthData, ntx)){
uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 64);
uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 96);
struct Crypto1State *pcs = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
crypto1_destroy(pcs);
if (CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, mfData, cmdsize)) {
AuthData.ks2 = ks2;
AuthData.ks3 = ks3;
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
break;
}
}
}
if (traceCrypto1)
printf("key> nt=%08x nonce distance=%d \n", ntx, nonce_distance(AuthData.nt, ntx));
else
printf("key> don't have any valid nt( \n");
}
//hardnested
if (!traceCrypto1) {
printf("hardnested not implemented. uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
}
}
MifareAuthState = masData;
}
if (MifareAuthState == masData && traceCrypto1) {
memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
mf_crypto1_decrypt(traceCrypto1, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
*mfDataLen = cmdsize;
}
return *mfDataLen > 0;
}
bool NTParityChk(TAuthData *ad, uint32_t ntx) {
if (
(oddparity8(ntx >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ntx & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(ntx >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(ntx >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
)
return false;
uint32_t ar = prng_successor(ntx, 64);
if (
(oddparity8(ar >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ar & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(ar >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(ar >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
)
return false;
uint32_t at = prng_successor(ntx, 96);
if (
(oddparity8(ar & 0xff) ^ (at >> 24 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 4) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 24 & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(at >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (at & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(at >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
(oddparity8(at >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
)
return false;
return true;
}
bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity) {
uint8_t buf[32] = {0};
struct Crypto1State *pcs;
AuthData.ks2 = 0;
AuthData.ks3 = 0;
pcs = crypto1_create(key);
uint32_t nt1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nt_enc ^ ad->uid, 1) ^ ad->nt_enc;
uint32_t ar = prng_successor(nt1, 64);
uint32_t at = prng_successor(nt1, 96);
crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1);
// uint32_t nr1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1) ^ ad->nr_enc; // if needs deciphered nr
uint32_t ar1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->ar_enc;
uint32_t at1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->at_enc;
if (!(ar == ar1 && at == at1 && NTParityChk(ad, nt1)))
return false;
memcpy(buf, cmd, cmdsize);
mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, buf, cmdsize, 0);
crypto1_destroy(pcs);
if(!CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, buf, cmdsize))
return false;
if (!CheckCrypto1Parity(cmd, cmdsize, buf, parity))
return false;
AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ ar;
AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ at;
return true;
}
bool CheckCrypto1Parity(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *cmd_enc, uint8_t *parity_enc) {
printf("parity check. size=%d\n", cmdsize);
printf("cmd =%s\n", sprint_hex(cmd, cmdsize));
printf("cmd_enc=%s\n", sprint_hex(cmd_enc, cmdsize));
printf("parity=%s\n", printBitsPar(parity_enc, cmdsize));
// (oddparity8(ntx >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ntx & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc & 0x01)) ||
for (int i = 0; i < cmdsize - 1; i++) {
bool b = oddparity8(cmd[i]) ^ (cmd[i + 1] & 0x01) ^ ((parity_enc[i / 8] >> (6 - i % 8)) & 0x01) ^ (cmd_enc[i + 1] & 0x01);
printf("i=%d b=%d\n", i, b);
if (b)
return false;
}
return true;
}
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