Removed rdp-sec-check dependency for rdp-proxy

This commit is contained in:
Pourliver 2019-05-22 09:58:24 -04:00
commit 1e8bd24bf7

View file

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package rdp_proxy
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"io"
@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ import (
golog "log"
"net"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
"syscall"
"github.com/bettercap/bettercap/core"
@ -31,7 +32,6 @@ type RdpProxy struct {
port int
startPort int
cmd string
secCheck string
nlaMode string
redirectIP net.IP
redirectPort int
@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ func NewRdpProxy(s *session.Session) *RdpProxy {
port: 3389,
startPort: 40000,
cmd: "pyrdp-mitm.py",
secCheck: "",
nlaMode: "IGNORE",
redirectIP: make(net.IP, 0),
redirectPort: 3389,
@ -79,8 +78,7 @@ mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.out", "./", "", "The output d
mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.targets", session.ParamSubnet, "", "Comma separated list of IP addresses to proxy to, also supports nmap style IP ranges."))
mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.regexp", "(?i)(cookie:|mstshash=|clipboard data|client info|credential|username|password|error)", "", "Print PyRDP logs matching this regular expression."))
// Optional paramaters
mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.nla.seccheck", "", "", "Path to rdp-sec-check.pl. Allows more complex exploits when NLA is enforced (optional)."))
mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.nla.mode", "IGNORE", "(IGNORE|RELAY|REDIRECT)", "Specify how to handle connections to a NLA-enabled host. Either IGNORE, RELAY or REDIRECT. Require rdp.proxy.nla.seccheck."))
mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.nla.mode", "IGNORE", "(IGNORE|RELAY|REDIRECT)", "Specify how to handle connections to a NLA-enabled host. Either IGNORE, RELAY or REDIRECT."))
mod.AddParam(session.NewStringParameter("rdp.proxy.nla.redirect.ip", "", "", "Specify IP to redirect clients that connects to NLA targets. Require rdp.proxy.nla.mode REDIRECT"))
mod.AddParam(session.NewIntParameter("rdp.proxy.nla.redirect.port", "3389", "Specify port to redirect clients that connects to NLA targets. Require rdp.proxy.nla.mode REDIRECT"))
@ -109,23 +107,61 @@ func (mod *RdpProxy) isTarget(ip string) bool {
return false
}
func (mod *RdpProxy) isNLAEnforced(target string) (nla bool, err error) {
if mod.secCheck == "" {
return false, err
// Verify if the target says anything about enforcing NLA.
func verifyNLA(target string, payload []byte) (isNla bool, err error) {
var conn net.Conn
if conn, err = net.Dial("tcp", target); err != nil {
return true, err
} else if err = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)); err != nil {
return true, err
}
output, err := core.Exec(mod.secCheck, []string{
target,
})
defer conn.Close()
// Hybrid means enforce NLA + SSL
if strings.Contains(output, "HYBRID_REQUIRED_BY_SERVER") {
conn.Write([]byte(payload))
if _, err = conn.Write([]byte(payload)); err != nil {
return true, err
}
buffer := make([]byte, 1024)
if n, err := conn.Read(buffer[:]); n != 19 || err != nil {
return true, err
}
// If failure code is HYBRID_REQUIRED_BY_SERVER
if buffer[11] == 3 && buffer[15] == 5 {
return true, err
}
return false, err
}
func (mod *RdpProxy) isNLAEnforced(target string) (nla bool, err error){
// TCP payloads to validate if RDP and TLS are supported.
// Will return a special value if NLA is enforced
rdpPayload, _ := hex.DecodeString("030000130ee000000000000100080000000000")
tlsPayload, _ := hex.DecodeString("030000130ee000000000000100080001000000")
var nlaCheck1 bool
var nlaCheck2 bool
if nlaCheck1, err = verifyNLA(target, rdpPayload); err != nil {
return true, err
} else if nlaCheck2, err = verifyNLA(target, tlsPayload); err != nil {
return true, err
}
// If NLA is enforced
if nlaCheck1 && nlaCheck2 {
return true, nil
}
return false, nil
}
func (mod *RdpProxy) startProxyInstance(src string, sport string, dst string, dport string) (err error) {
target := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dst, dport)
ips := fmt.Sprintf("[%s:%s -> %s:%s]", src, sport, dst, dport)
@ -265,8 +301,6 @@ func (mod *RdpProxy) Configure() (err error) {
return
} else if err, mod.regexp = mod.StringParam("rdp.proxy.regexp"); err != nil {
return
} else if err, mod.secCheck = mod.StringParam("rdp.proxy.nla.seccheck"); err != nil {
return
} else if err, mod.nlaMode = mod.StringParam("rdp.proxy.nla.mode"); err != nil {
return
} else if mod.nlaMode == "RELAY" {
@ -280,10 +314,6 @@ func (mod *RdpProxy) Configure() (err error) {
if mod.compiled, err = regexp.Compile(mod.regexp); err != nil {
return
}
} else if mod.secCheck != "" {
if _, err = exec.LookPath(mod.secCheck); err != nil {
return
}
} else if _, err = exec.LookPath(mod.cmd); err != nil {
return
}
@ -332,7 +362,6 @@ func (mod *RdpProxy) handleRdpConnection(payload *nfqueue.Payload) int {
if _, ok := mod.active[target]; !ok {
targetNLA, _ := mod.isNLAEnforced(target)
// Only if seccheck is set
if targetNLA {
switch mod.nlaMode {
case "REDIRECT":
@ -360,10 +389,7 @@ func (mod *RdpProxy) handleRdpConnection(payload *nfqueue.Payload) int {
}
} else {
// Starts a PyRDP instance.
// Won't work if the target has NLA but rdp-sec-check isn't set
err := mod.startProxyInstance(src, sport, dst, dport)
if err != nil {
if err := mod.startProxyInstance(src, sport, dst, dport); err != nil {
// Add an exception in the firewall to avoid intercepting packets to this destination and port
mod.doReturn(dst, dport)
payload.SetVerdict(nfqueue.NF_DROP)