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added a port of aes_gmac_siv

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mamoniot 2023-02-25 20:27:16 -05:00
commit bac600ba2e
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1 changed files with 111 additions and 63 deletions
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168
openssl-zt/src/aes_gmac_siv.rs
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@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
use std::ptr;
use foreign_types::ForeignType;
use crate::cipher_ctx::CipherCtx;
pub const ZEROES: [u8; 64] = [0_u8; 64];
/// AES-GMAC-SIV encryptor/decryptor. /// AES-GMAC-SIV encryptor/decryptor.
pub struct AesGmacSiv { pub struct AesGmacSiv {
@ -5,8 +12,8 @@ pub struct AesGmacSiv {
tmp: [u8; 16], tmp: [u8; 16],
k0: Vec<u8>, k0: Vec<u8>,
k1: Vec<u8>, k1: Vec<u8>,
ctr: Option<Crypter>, ctr: Option<CipherCtx>,
gmac: Option<Crypter>, gmac: Option<CipherCtx>,
} }
impl AesGmacSiv { impl AesGmacSiv {
@ -41,15 +48,18 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
pub fn encrypt_init(&mut self, iv: &[u8]) { pub fn encrypt_init(&mut self, iv: &[u8]) {
self.tag[0..8].copy_from_slice(iv); self.tag[0..8].copy_from_slice(iv);
self.tag[8..12].fill(0); self.tag[8..12].fill(0);
let _ = self.gmac.replace(
Crypter::new( let mut ctx = CipherCtx::new().unwrap();
aes_gcm_by_key_size(self.k0.len()), unsafe {
Mode::Encrypt, let t = match self.k0.len() {
self.k0.as_slice(), 16 => ffi::EVP_aes_128_gcm(),
Some(&self.tag[0..12]), 24 => ffi::EVP_aes_192_gcm(),
) 32 => ffi::EVP_aes_256_gcm(),
.unwrap(), _ => panic!("Aes KEY_SIZE must be 16, 24 or 32")
); };
ctx.cipher_init::<true>(t, self.k0.as_mut_ptr(), self.tag[0..12].as_ptr()).unwrap();
}
let _ = self.gmac.replace(ctx);
} }
/// Set additional authenticated data (data to be authenticated but not encrypted). /// Set additional authenticated data (data to be authenticated but not encrypted).
@ -57,11 +67,13 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn encrypt_set_aad(&mut self, data: &[u8]) { pub fn encrypt_set_aad(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
let gmac = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap(); let gmac = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap();
let _ = gmac.aad_update(data); unsafe {
gmac.update::<true>(data, ptr::null_mut()).unwrap();
let mut pad = data.len() & 0xf; let mut pad = data.len() & 0xf;
if pad != 0 { if pad != 0 {
pad = 16 - pad; pad = 16 - pad;
let _ = gmac.aad_update(&crate::ZEROES[0..pad]); gmac.update::<true>(&ZEROES[0..pad], ptr::null_mut()).unwrap();
}
} }
} }
@ -69,15 +81,20 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
/// This may be called more than once. /// This may be called more than once.
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn encrypt_first_pass(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) { pub fn encrypt_first_pass(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) {
let _ = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap().aad_update(plaintext); unsafe {
self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap().update::<true>(plaintext, ptr::null_mut()).unwrap();
}
} }
/// Finish first pass and begin second pass. /// Finish first pass and begin second pass.
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn encrypt_first_pass_finish(&mut self) { pub fn encrypt_first_pass_finish(&mut self) {
let gmac = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap(); let gmac = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap();
let _ = gmac.finalize(&mut self.tmp); unsafe {
let _ = gmac.get_tag(&mut self.tmp); gmac.finalize::<true>(self.tmp.as_mut_ptr()).unwrap();
gmac.tag(&mut self.tmp).unwrap();
}
self.tag[8] = self.tmp[0] ^ self.tmp[8]; self.tag[8] = self.tmp[0] ^ self.tmp[8];
self.tag[9] = self.tmp[1] ^ self.tmp[9]; self.tag[9] = self.tmp[1] ^ self.tmp[9];
self.tag[10] = self.tmp[2] ^ self.tmp[10]; self.tag[10] = self.tmp[2] ^ self.tmp[10];
@ -88,41 +105,54 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
self.tag[15] = self.tmp[7] ^ self.tmp[15]; self.tag[15] = self.tmp[7] ^ self.tmp[15];
let mut tag_tmp = [0_u8; 32]; let mut tag_tmp = [0_u8; 32];
let mut ecb = Crypter::new(aes_ecb_by_key_size(self.k1.len()), Mode::Encrypt, self.k1.as_slice(), None).unwrap();
ecb.pad(false); let mut ctx = CipherCtx::new().unwrap();
if ecb.update(&self.tag, &mut tag_tmp).unwrap() != 16 { unsafe {
assert_eq!(ecb.finalize(&mut tag_tmp).unwrap(), 16); let t = match self.k1.len() {
16 => ffi::EVP_aes_128_ecb(),
24 => ffi::EVP_aes_192_ecb(),
32 => ffi::EVP_aes_256_ecb(),
_ => panic!("Aes KEY_SIZE must be 16, 24 or 32")
};
ctx.cipher_init::<true>(t, self.k1.as_mut_ptr(), ptr::null_mut()).unwrap();
ffi::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.as_ptr(), 0);
ctx.update::<true>(&self.tag, tag_tmp.as_mut_ptr()).unwrap();
} }
self.tag.copy_from_slice(&tag_tmp[0..16]); self.tag.copy_from_slice(&tag_tmp[0..16]);
self.tmp.copy_from_slice(&tag_tmp[0..16]); self.tmp.copy_from_slice(&tag_tmp[0..16]);
self.tmp[12] &= 0x7f; self.tmp[12] &= 0x7f;
let _ = self.ctr.replace(
Crypter::new( let mut ctx = CipherCtx::new().unwrap();
aes_ctr_by_key_size(self.k1.len()), unsafe {
Mode::Encrypt, let t = match self.k1.len() {
self.k1.as_slice(), 16 => ffi::EVP_aes_128_ctr(),
Some(&self.tmp), 24 => ffi::EVP_aes_192_ctr(),
) 32 => ffi::EVP_aes_256_ctr(),
.unwrap(), _ => panic!("Aes KEY_SIZE must be 16, 24 or 32")
); };
ctx.cipher_init::<true>(t, self.k1.as_mut_ptr(), self.tmp.as_ptr()).unwrap();
}
let _ = self.ctr.replace(ctx);
} }
/// Feed plaintext for second pass and write ciphertext to supplied buffer. /// Feed plaintext for second pass and write ciphertext to supplied buffer.
/// This may be called more than once. /// This may be called more than once.
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn encrypt_second_pass(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8], ciphertext: &mut [u8]) { pub fn encrypt_second_pass(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8], ciphertext: &mut [u8]) {
let _ = self.ctr.as_mut().unwrap().update(plaintext, ciphertext); unsafe {
self.ctr.as_mut().unwrap().update::<true>(plaintext, ciphertext.as_mut_ptr()).unwrap();
}
} }
/// Encrypt plaintext in place. /// Encrypt plaintext in place.
/// This may be called more than once. /// This may be called more than once.
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn encrypt_second_pass_in_place(&mut self, plaintext_to_ciphertext: &mut [u8]) { pub fn encrypt_second_pass_in_place(&mut self, plaintext_to_ciphertext: &mut [u8]) {
let _ = self.ctr.as_mut().unwrap().update( unsafe {
unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(plaintext_to_ciphertext.as_ptr(), plaintext_to_ciphertext.len()) }, let out = plaintext_to_ciphertext.as_mut_ptr();
plaintext_to_ciphertext, self.ctr.as_mut().unwrap().update::<true>(plaintext_to_ciphertext, out).unwrap();
); }
} }
/// Finish second pass and return a reference to the tag for this message. /// Finish second pass and return a reference to the tag for this message.
@ -138,33 +168,47 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
pub fn decrypt_init(&mut self, tag: &[u8]) { pub fn decrypt_init(&mut self, tag: &[u8]) {
self.tmp.copy_from_slice(tag); self.tmp.copy_from_slice(tag);
self.tmp[12] &= 0x7f; self.tmp[12] &= 0x7f;
let _ = self.ctr.replace(
Crypter::new( let mut ctx = CipherCtx::new().unwrap();
aes_ctr_by_key_size(self.k1.len()), unsafe {
Mode::Decrypt, let t = match self.k1.len() {
self.k1.as_slice(), 16 => ffi::EVP_aes_128_ctr(),
Some(&self.tmp), 24 => ffi::EVP_aes_192_ctr(),
) 32 => ffi::EVP_aes_256_ctr(),
.unwrap(), _ => panic!("Aes KEY_SIZE must be 16, 24 or 32")
); };
ctx.cipher_init::<false>(t, self.k1.as_mut_ptr(), self.tmp.as_ptr()).unwrap();
}
let _ = self.ctr.replace(ctx);
let mut tag_tmp = [0_u8; 32]; let mut tag_tmp = [0_u8; 32];
let mut ecb = Crypter::new(aes_ecb_by_key_size(self.k1.len()), Mode::Decrypt, self.k1.as_slice(), None).unwrap();
ecb.pad(false); let mut ctx = CipherCtx::new().unwrap();
if ecb.update(tag, &mut tag_tmp).unwrap() != 16 { unsafe {
assert_eq!(ecb.finalize(&mut tag_tmp).unwrap(), 16); let t = match self.k1.len() {
16 => ffi::EVP_aes_128_ecb(),
24 => ffi::EVP_aes_192_ecb(),
32 => ffi::EVP_aes_256_ecb(),
_ => panic!("Aes KEY_SIZE must be 16, 24 or 32")
};
ctx.cipher_init::<false>(t, self.k1.as_mut_ptr(), ptr::null_mut()).unwrap();
ffi::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.as_ptr(), 0);
ctx.update::<false>(&self.tag, tag_tmp.as_mut_ptr()).unwrap();
} }
self.tag.copy_from_slice(&tag_tmp[0..16]); self.tag.copy_from_slice(&tag_tmp[0..16]);
tag_tmp[8..12].fill(0); tag_tmp[8..12].fill(0);
let _ = self.gmac.replace(
Crypter::new( let mut ctx = CipherCtx::new().unwrap();
aes_gcm_by_key_size(self.k0.len()), unsafe {
Mode::Encrypt, let t = match self.k0.len() {
self.k0.as_slice(), 16 => ffi::EVP_aes_128_gcm(),
Some(&tag_tmp[0..12]), 24 => ffi::EVP_aes_192_gcm(),
) 32 => ffi::EVP_aes_256_gcm(),
.unwrap(), _ => panic!("Aes KEY_SIZE must be 16, 24 or 32")
); };
ctx.cipher_init::<true>(t, self.k0.as_mut_ptr(), self.tag[0..12].as_ptr()).unwrap();
}
let _ = self.gmac.replace(ctx);
} }
/// Set additional authenticated data to be checked. /// Set additional authenticated data to be checked.
@ -177,8 +221,10 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
/// This may be called more than once. /// This may be called more than once.
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn decrypt(&mut self, ciphertext: &[u8], plaintext: &mut [u8]) { pub fn decrypt(&mut self, ciphertext: &[u8], plaintext: &mut [u8]) {
let _ = self.ctr.as_mut().unwrap().update(ciphertext, plaintext); unsafe {
let _ = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap().aad_update(plaintext); self.ctr.as_mut().unwrap().update::<false>(ciphertext, plaintext.as_mut_ptr()).unwrap();
self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap().update::<false>(plaintext, ptr::null_mut()).unwrap();
}
} }
/// Decrypt ciphertext in place. /// Decrypt ciphertext in place.
@ -196,8 +242,10 @@ impl AesGmacSiv {
#[inline(always)] #[inline(always)]
pub fn decrypt_finish(&mut self) -> Option<&[u8; 16]> { pub fn decrypt_finish(&mut self) -> Option<&[u8; 16]> {
let gmac = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap(); let gmac = self.gmac.as_mut().unwrap();
let _ = gmac.finalize(&mut self.tmp); unsafe {
let _ = gmac.get_tag(&mut self.tmp); gmac.finalize::<false>(self.tmp.as_mut_ptr()).unwrap();
gmac.tag(&mut self.tmp).unwrap();
}
if (self.tag[8] == self.tmp[0] ^ self.tmp[8]) if (self.tag[8] == self.tmp[0] ^ self.tmp[8])
&& (self.tag[9] == self.tmp[1] ^ self.tmp[9]) && (self.tag[9] == self.tmp[1] ^ self.tmp[9])
&& (self.tag[10] == self.tmp[2] ^ self.tmp[10]) && (self.tag[10] == self.tmp[2] ^ self.tmp[10])