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ADD: @micolous random nonce, adjusted to fit in. Icemanfork only uses Moebius attack, so no need for an extra parameter in client.
ref: https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3/pull/209
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6c3795a315
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8 changed files with 90 additions and 28 deletions
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@ -849,6 +849,8 @@ bool prepare_allocated_tag_modulation(tag_response_info_t* response_info) {
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
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#define ATTACK_KEY_COUNT 8 // keep same as define in cmdhfmf.c -> readerAttack()
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uint8_t sak = 0;
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uint32_t cuid = 0;
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uint32_t nonce = 0;
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@ -866,7 +868,7 @@ void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
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uint8_t cardAUTHSC = 0;
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uint8_t cardAUTHKEY = 0xff; // no authentication
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// allow collecting up to 8 sets of nonces to allow recovery of up to 8 keys
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#define ATTACK_KEY_COUNT 8 // keep same as define in cmdhfmf.c -> readerAttack()
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nonces_t ar_nr_resp[ATTACK_KEY_COUNT*2]; // for 2 separate attack types (nml, moebius)
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memset(ar_nr_resp, 0x00, sizeof(ar_nr_resp));
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@ -972,16 +974,17 @@ void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
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response3a[0] = sak & 0xFB;
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ComputeCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, response3a, 1, &response3a[1], &response3a[2]);
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uint8_t response5[] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; // Very random tag nonce
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// Tag NONCE.
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uint8_t response5[4];
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nonce = prand();
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num_to_bytes(nonce, 4, response5);
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uint8_t response6[] = { 0x04, 0x58, 0x80, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00 }; // dummy ATS (pseudo-ATR), answer to RATS:
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// Format byte = 0x58: FSCI=0x08 (FSC=256), TA(1) and TC(1) present,
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// TA(1) = 0x80: different divisors not supported, DR = 1, DS = 1
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// TB(1) = not present. Defaults: FWI = 4 (FWT = 256 * 16 * 2^4 * 1/fc = 4833us), SFGI = 0 (SFG = 256 * 16 * 2^0 * 1/fc = 302us)
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// TC(1) = 0x02: CID supported, NAD not supported
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ComputeCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, response6, 4, &response6[4], &response6[5]);
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// the randon nonce
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nonce = bytes_to_num(response5, 4);
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// Prepare GET_VERSION (different for UL EV-1 / NTAG)
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// uint8_t response7_EV1[] = {0x00, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x03, 0xfd, 0xf7}; //EV1 48bytes VERSION.
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@ -1058,7 +1061,7 @@ void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
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}
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// incease nonce at every command recieved
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nonce++;
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nonce = prand();
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num_to_bytes(nonce, 4, response5);
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p_response = NULL;
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@ -1173,8 +1176,16 @@ void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
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// Collect AR/NR per keytype & sector
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if ( (flags & FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK) == FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK ) {
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < ATTACK_KEY_COUNT; i++) {
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if ( ar_nr_collected[i+mM]==0 || ((cardAUTHSC == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].sector) && (cardAUTHKEY == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].keytype) && (ar_nr_collected[i+mM] > 0)) ) {
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if ( ar_nr_collected[i+mM] == 0 || (
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(cardAUTHSC == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].sector) &&
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(cardAUTHKEY == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].keytype) &&
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(ar_nr_collected[i+mM] > 0)
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)
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) {
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// if first auth for sector, or matches sector and keytype of previous auth
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if (ar_nr_collected[i+mM] < 2) {
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// if we haven't already collected 2 nonces for this sector
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@ -1360,7 +1371,7 @@ void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
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BigBuf_free_keep_EM();
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LED_A_OFF();
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if(flags & FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK && MF_DBGLEVEL >= 1) {
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if(flags & FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK && MF_DBGLEVEL >= 1) {
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for ( uint8_t i = 0; i < ATTACK_KEY_COUNT; i++) {
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if (ar_nr_collected[i] == 2) {
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Dbprintf("Collected two pairs of AR/NR which can be used to extract %s from reader for sector %d:", (i<ATTACK_KEY_COUNT/2) ? "keyA" : "keyB", ar_nr_resp[i].sector);
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@ -2472,10 +2483,14 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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uint8_t rUIDBCC2[] = {0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xaf, 0x62};
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uint8_t rUIDBCC3[] = {0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xaf, 0x62};
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uint8_t rAUTH_NT[] = {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01}; // very random nonce
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// TAG Nonce - Authenticate response
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uint8_t rAUTH_NT[4];
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uint32_t nonce = prand();
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num_to_bytes(nonce, 4, rAUTH_NT);
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// uint8_t rAUTH_NT[] = {0x55, 0x41, 0x49, 0x92};// nonce from nested? why this?
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uint8_t rAUTH_AT[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
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// Here, we collect CUID, NT, NR, AR, CUID2, NT2, NR2, AR2
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// This can be used in a reader-only attack.
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nonces_t ar_nr_resp[ATTACK_KEY_COUNT*2]; // for 2 separate attack types (nml, moebius)
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@ -2490,9 +2505,6 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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uint8_t mM = 0; // moebius_modifier for collection storage
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bool doBufResetNext = false;
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// Authenticate response - nonce
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uint32_t nonce = bytes_to_num(rAUTH_NT, 4);
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// -- Determine the UID
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// Can be set from emulator memory or incoming data
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// Length: 4,7,or 10 bytes
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@ -2628,7 +2640,7 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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crypto1_destroy(pcs);
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cardAUTHKEY = 0xff;
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LEDsoff();
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nonce++;
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nonce = prand();
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continue;
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}
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@ -2743,7 +2755,13 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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}
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < ATTACK_KEY_COUNT; i++) {
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if ( ar_nr_collected[i+mM]==0 || ((cardAUTHSC == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].sector) && (cardAUTHKEY == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].keytype) && (ar_nr_collected[i+mM] > 0)) ) {
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if ( ar_nr_collected[i+mM] == 0 || (
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(cardAUTHSC == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].sector) &&
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(cardAUTHKEY == ar_nr_resp[i+mM].keytype) &&
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(ar_nr_collected[i+mM] > 0)
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)
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) {
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// if first auth for sector, or matches sector and keytype of previous auth
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if (ar_nr_collected[i+mM] < 2) {
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@ -2788,7 +2806,7 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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// if we've collected all the nonces we need - finish.
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if (nonce1_count == moebius_n_count) {
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cmd_send(CMD_ACK,CMD_SIMULATE_MIFARE_CARD,0,0,&ar_nr_resp,sizeof(ar_nr_resp));
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cmd_send(CMD_ACK, CMD_SIMULATE_MIFARE_CARD, 0, 0, &ar_nr_resp, sizeof(ar_nr_resp));
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nonce1_count = 0;
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nonce2_count = 0;
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moebius_n_count = 0;
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@ -3058,13 +3076,13 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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// Interactive mode flag, means we need to send ACK
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/*
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if((flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE) == FLAG_INTERACTIVE) {
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if((flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE) == FLAG_INTERACTIVE && flags & FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK == FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK) {
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// May just aswell send the collected ar_nr in the response aswell
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uint8_t len = ar_nr_collected * 4 * 4;
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cmd_send(CMD_ACK, CMD_SIMULATE_MIFARE_CARD, len, 0, &ar_nr_responses, len);
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}
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*/
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*/
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if( ((flags & FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK) == FLAG_NR_AR_ATTACK ) && MF_DBGLEVEL >= 1 ) {
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for ( uint8_t i = 0; i < ATTACK_KEY_COUNT; i++) {
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if (ar_nr_collected[i] == 2) {
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@ -3093,10 +3111,10 @@ void Mifare1ksim(uint8_t flags, uint8_t exitAfterNReads, uint8_t arg2, uint8_t *
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);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (MF_DBGLEVEL >= 1) Dbprintf("Emulator stopped. Tracing: %d trace length: %d ", tracing, BigBuf_get_traceLen());
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if (MF_DBGLEVEL >= 1)
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Dbprintf("Emulator stopped. Tracing: %d trace length: %d ", tracing, BigBuf_get_traceLen());
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FpgaWriteConfWord(FPGA_MAJOR_MODE_OFF);
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LEDsoff();
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