github/RRG-Proxmark3
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/RfidResearchGroup/proxmark3.git synced 2025-08-14 10:37:23 -07:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

chg: 'hf list mf' - adapted the output from 16bytes rows to 18 in order to make output more easily to compare

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
iceman1001 2018-02-15 11:47:34 +01:00
commit a1dd7c2020
5 changed files with 40 additions and 45 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

37
client/cmdhflist.c
View file

@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ uint8_t iso14443A_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* d, uint8_t n) {
return check_crc(CRC_14443_A, d, n);
}
uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
{
uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len) {
switch(MifareAuthState) {
case masNone:
case masError:
@ -84,8 +83,7 @@ uint8_t iso15693_CRC_check(uint8_t* d, uint8_t n) {
* 1 : CRC-command, CRC ok
* 2 : Not crc-command
*/
uint8_t iclass_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* d, uint8_t n)
{
uint8_t iclass_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* d, uint8_t n) {
//CRC commands (and responses) are all at least 4 bytes
if (n < 4) return 2;
@ -632,11 +630,10 @@ bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity, bool isRes
AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
mfLastKey = GetCrypto1ProbableKey(&AuthData);
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | probable key:%012"PRIx64" Prng:%s ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
PrintAndLog(" | | * |%49s %012"PRIx64" prng %s | |",
"key",
mfLastKey,
validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD",
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD");
AuthData.first_auth = false;
@ -650,12 +647,8 @@ bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity, bool isRes
// check last used key
if (mfLastKey) {
if (NestedCheckKey(mfLastKey, &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize, parity)) {
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | last used key:%012"PRIx64" ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
mfLastKey,
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
PrintAndLog(" | | * |%60s %012"PRIx64"| |", "last used key", mfLastKey);
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
};
}
@ -663,10 +656,7 @@ bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity, bool isRes
if (!traceCrypto1) {
for (int i = 0; i < MIFARE_DEFAULTKEYS_SIZE; i++){
if (NestedCheckKey(g_mifare_default_keys[i], &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize, parity)) {
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | default key:%012"PRIx64" ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
g_mifare_default_keys[i],
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
PrintAndLog(" | | * |%61s %012"PRIx64"| |", "key", g_mifare_default_keys[i]);
mfLastKey = g_mifare_default_keys[i];
traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
@ -686,17 +676,15 @@ bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity, bool isRes
uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 96);
struct Crypto1State *pcs = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
crypto1_destroy(pcs);
if (CheckCrypto1Parity(cmd, cmdsize, mfData, parity) && check_crc(CRC_14443_A, mfData, cmdsize)) {
AuthData.ks2 = ks2;
AuthData.ks3 = ks3;
AuthData.nt = ntx;
mfLastKey = GetCrypto1ProbableKey(&AuthData);
PrintAndLog(" | * | key | nested probable key:%012"PRIx64" ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
PrintAndLog(" | | * | nested probable key:%012"PRIx64" ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
mfLastKey,
AuthData.ks2,
AuthData.ks3);
@ -799,7 +787,6 @@ bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize,
memcpy(buf, cmd, cmdsize);
mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, buf, cmdsize, 0);
crypto1_destroy(pcs);
if (!CheckCrypto1Parity(cmd, cmdsize, buf, parity))
@ -811,7 +798,6 @@ bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize,
AuthData.nt = nt1;
AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ ar;
AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ at;
return true;
}
@ -820,10 +806,11 @@ bool CheckCrypto1Parity(uint8_t *cmd_enc, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t
if (oddparity8(cmd[i]) ^ (cmd[i + 1] & 0x01) ^ ((parity_enc[i / 8] >> (7 - i % 8)) & 0x01) ^ (cmd_enc[i + 1] & 0x01))
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Another implementation of mfkey64 attack, more "valid" than "probable"
//
uint64_t GetCrypto1ProbableKey(TAuthData *ad) {
struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ad->ks2, ad->ks3);
lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);