FIX: at least now the special zero parity attack, repeats and doesn't crash. However it doesn't find the key either :(

This commit is contained in:
iceman1001 2016-08-10 10:55:29 +02:00
commit 6067df30c5
4 changed files with 19 additions and 10 deletions

View file

@ -867,10 +867,10 @@ void SimulateIso14443aTag(int tagType, int flags, byte_t* data) {
uint8_t cardAUTHKEY = 0xff; // no authentication
// allow collecting up to 8 sets of nonces to allow recovery of up to 8 keys
#define ATTACK_KEY_COUNT 8 // keep same as define in cmdhfmf.c -> readerAttack()
nonces_t ar_nr_resp[ATTACK_KEY_COUNT*2]; //*2 for 2 separate attack types (nml, moebius)
nonces_t ar_nr_resp[ATTACK_KEY_COUNT*2]; // for 2 separate attack types (nml, moebius)
memset(ar_nr_resp, 0x00, sizeof(ar_nr_resp));
uint8_t ar_nr_collected[ATTACK_KEY_COUNT*2]; //*2 for 2nd attack type (moebius)
uint8_t ar_nr_collected[ATTACK_KEY_COUNT*2]; // for 2nd attack type (moebius)
memset(ar_nr_collected, 0x00, sizeof(ar_nr_collected));
uint8_t nonce1_count = 0;
uint8_t nonce2_count = 0;
@ -2218,10 +2218,11 @@ void ReaderMifare(bool first_try, uint8_t block, uint8_t keytype ) {
set_tracing(TRUE);
iso14443a_setup(FPGA_HF_ISO14443A_READER_MOD);
if (first_try) {
sync_time = GetCountSspClk() & 0xfffffff8;
sync_cycles = PRNG_SEQUENCE_LENGTH + 1130; //65536; //0x10000 // Mifare Classic's random generator repeats every 2^16 cycles (and so do the nonces).
sync_time = GetCountSspClk() & 0xfffffff8;
// iceman, i add 1130 because during my observations this makse the syncronization much fast to sync.
sync_cycles = PRNG_SEQUENCE_LENGTH + 1130; //65536; // Mifare Classic's random generator repeats every 2^16 cycles (and so do the nonces).
if (first_try) {
mf_nr_ar3 = 0;
nt_attacked = 0;
par_low = 0;
@ -2294,7 +2295,9 @@ void ReaderMifare(bool first_try, uint8_t block, uint8_t keytype ) {
WDT_HIT();
LED_B_ON();
if (first_try && previous_nt && !nt_attacked) { // we didn't calibrate our clock yet
// we didn't calibrate our clock yet,
// iceman: has to be calibrated every time.
if (previous_nt && !nt_attacked) {
nt_distance = dist_nt(previous_nt, nt);

View file

@ -217,7 +217,12 @@ start:
if (isOK == -4 && par_list == 0) {
// this special attack when parities is zero, uses checkkeys. Which now with block/keytype option also needs.
// but it uses 0|1 instead of 0x60|0x61...
if (!nonce2key_ex(blockNo, keytype - 0x60 , uid, nt, nr, ks_list, &r_key) ){
if (nonce2key_ex(blockNo, keytype - 0x60 , uid, nt, nr, ks_list, &r_key) ){
PrintAndLog("Key not found (lfsr_common_prefix list is null).");
PrintAndLog("Failing is expected to happen in 25%% of all cases. Trying again with a different reader nonce...");
c.arg[0] = false;
goto start;
} else {
PrintAndLog("Found valid key: %012"llx" \n", r_key);
goto END;
}

View file

@ -549,7 +549,8 @@ struct Crypto1State* lfsr_common_prefix_ex(uint32_t pfx, uint8_t ks[8])
s = check_pfx_parity_ex(pfx, *o, *e, s);
}
s->odd = s->even = 0;
// in this version, -1 signifies end of states
s->odd = s->even = -1;
out:
free(odd);

View file

@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ int nonce2key_ex(uint8_t blockno, uint8_t keytype, uint32_t uid, uint32_t nt, ui
state = lfsr_common_prefix_ex(nr, ks3x);
state_s = (int64_t*)state;
PrintAndLog("Prefix");
for (i = 0; (state) && ((state + i)->odd != -1); i++) {
lfsr_rollback_word(state + i, uid ^ nt, 0);
@ -152,6 +151,7 @@ int nonce2key_ex(uint8_t blockno, uint8_t keytype, uint32_t uid, uint32_t nt, ui
}
}
free(last_keylist);
last_keylist = state_s;
return 1;